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1. INTRODUCTION
This note concerns the continuity of the upper and lower value for a
zero-sum, differential game, with dynamics and payoff of the form
x s f t , x , a, c .Ç
x t s x .
and
Tw xP t , x ; a, c s l t , x , a, c dt q g x T , .  . .Ç H
t
respectively. The goal of the player maneuvering a is to minimize the
payoff P, while the player acting by means of c wishes to maximize P. The
control a is con¨entional, i.e., it takes values in a compact subset A of an
Euclidean space R q. On the contrary, the control c is allowed to range
over a cone C ; R m, and it has just to satisfy an integral constraint of the
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form
T
< <c t dt F K y k , .H
t
where K and k are fixed constants with 0 F k F K.
The consideration of unbounded controls is not new in the literature of
 w x.differential games see, e.g., 2, 9, 18]20 . Yet, a coercivity hypothesis is
often assumed, e.g., in the linear-quadratic problem or in nonlinear prob-
lems displaying a similar growth. Under such an hypothesis the values of c
 .which are larger than a certain constant depending on the initial data
turn out to be disadvantageous for the c-Player. This allows one to reduce
the problem to an equivalent one with bounded controls. On the contrary,
we assume that both the dynamics f and the Lagrangian l are sublinear}in
a sense made precise in Section 2}in the unbounded control c g C. Due
to this slow growth hypothesis, larger and larger values of c are possibly
exploited in the construction of optimal strategies.
Our ultimate goal is extending the dynamic programming approach to
these questions. Within this program the present note represents a prelim-
inary step, in that the continuity of the upper and lower value}besides
being of obvious intrinsic interest}is crucial for recovering these func-
 w x.tions as the unique viscosity 6 solutions of suitable boundary value
problems. Actually, this objective will be achieved in a forthcoming paper
w x16 , now in preparation.
As a whole, the present paper and the forthcoming one can be regarded
as a generalization and a simplification of the second part of a recent paper
w x w xby Barron, Jensen, and Menaldi 1 . As for the first part of 1 , where
optimal control problems were considered, an analogous program has been
already accomplished by the author in collaboration with M. Motta in
w x13, 14 .
As a matter of fact, the generalization consists in the consideration of an
w xenlarged class of problems. Indeed, in 1 the state is scalar-valued and the
dynamics and the Lagrangian reduce to
f s f t , x t , a t q f t , a t .  .  . .  .0 1
and
l s l t , x t , a t q l t , a t c, .  .  . . 0 1
q  w xrespectively, where c g C s R actually, in 1 , c is a measure; yet, inÇ
view of closure properties of the set of trajectories, the problem is
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.equivalent to the one with unbounded controls . As it is well known from
 w x.the analogous optimal control problem see, e.g., 3, 12 , the fact that f
and l are independent of x yields a remarkable simplification in the
description of the limit trajectories. Indeed the latter are maps with
bounded variation which satisfy the dynamical equation in a measure
theoretic sense. This approach, which is based on a substantial linearity of
 w x.the problem see, e.g., 4 , cannot be extended to the more general case
considered here.
w xThe claimed simplification is a matter of the forthcoming paper 16 .
Since the latter represents the main motivation for the present work, let us
w xjust sketch its contents. Roughly, in Barron, Jenson, and Menaldi 1 the
Hamiltonians are discontinuous and the control sets involved in the Isaacs
 .equations depend on the gradient of the solution itself. Instead, the
w xIsaacs equations we establish in 16 , besides concerning a wider class of
problems, involve continuous Hamiltonians and a constant, compact set of
w xcontrols. Moreover, while the boundary conditions of 1 need the explicit
w xcomputation of an auxiliary value function, our conditions 16 involve only
a Cauch-type equality and subsolution relations.
Here, on the one hand we prove the continuity of the upper and lower
value, and, on the other hand, we demonstrate that these maps can be
 .continuously extended to the right extremum the horizon of the time
w xinterval 0, T where the game takes place. This latter property will be
w xessential in the uniqueness result that will be proved in 16 .
Some steps of the proof of the continuity of the upper and lower value
are similar to the proof of the analogous result for the conventional case
 w x.see 8 . Yet the unboundedness of the control c does not allow the
exploitation of a Lipschitz continuity argument which is crucial in the
conventional case. Thanks to the bound on the L1 norm of the controls
 .c ? , the Lipschitz continuity argument is replaced with a method involving
linear reparameterizations converging to the identity. Moreover, an essen-
tial role is played by the continuity properties of a superposition operator
naturally involved in the problem.
We conclude by observing that the investigation of differential games
with slow growth is partially motivated by the fact that in some models the
variables controlled by one of the two opponents coincide with the deriva-
 w x.tive of a stocked quantity see, e.g., 5, 7, 10, 11, 15, 17 . Such a situation
occurs, e.g., in the so-called minimum fuel problems. Hence, though the L1
norms of these control variables are bounded by the total amounts of the
stocked quantities, no reasons motivate the imposition of a bound on
the corresponding L` norms. Furthermore, when}as in the present case
}the dynamics are sublinear in the unbounded controls, no coercivity
arguments can be invoked in order to reduce the problem to one with
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bounded controls. A further motivation for investigating slow growth
differential games comes from H control problems where a sublinear`
performance index replaces the usual quadratic one for an illustration of
w x.the general H control problem see, e.g., 2 .`
2. THE PROBLEM AND THE MAIN RESULT
We consider a differential game of fixed duration governed by dynamics
of the form
w xx s f t , x , a, c , x t s x t g t , T , 2.1 .  .  .
q .where 0 F t - T , a ? ranges over a compact subset A ; R , and the
 . m control c ? takes values in a closed cone C ; R by cone we mean a
subset of a real vector space, closed under multiplication by nonnegative
.  .scalars . The admissible controls a ? are Lebesgue measurable maps from
w x  .t, T into A, and we denote this set by A t . These controls may be
thought as implemented by a player, say the a-Player. The latter is a
con¨entional player, in that a takes bounded values. On the contrary, let
 .K ) 0, and for every nonnegative k F K let us define the family C t, k of
admissible controls for the a-Player's opponent, say the c-Player, as the set
 . w xof integrable maps c ? from t, T into C satisfying the integral bound
T
< <c t dt F K y k . .H
t
Notice that, unlike the controls a, the maps c are unbounded in the L`
norm.
 .Throughout the paper we shall assume Hypotheses H below, which, for
 .  .  .every control pair a, c g A t = C t, k , guarantees the global existence,
 .uniqueness, and exponential growth of a solution to 2.1 . Let us denote
w xthis solution by x t, x; a, c or, whenever the initial data are meant from
w x nthe context, by x a, c . Let g : R ª R be a continuous bounded function
 .and let l s l t, x, a, c be a scalar function defined on the domain of f. Let
us consider the payoff,
Tw x w x w xP t , x ; a, c s g x , a, c T q l t , x a, c t , a t , c t dt , .  .  .  . .  .Ç H
t
 .  .which, under Hypotheses H below, is well defined for every a, c g
 .  .  .A t = C t, k and every initial data t, x . Whenever the initial data are
w x w xmeant by the context we shall write P a, c instead of P t, x, a, c .
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On the maps l, f we shall assume the following hypotheses:
 .  .  .HYPOTHESES H . i Regularity The functions f and l are continuous
w x n non 0, T = R = A = C. Moreo¨er, for e¨ery compact subset Q ; R there
exists a constant L ) 0 such that
< < < < < <f , l t9, x9, a, c y f , l t , x , a, c F L 1 q c t9, x9 y t , x .  .  .  .  .  .  .
w x; t9, x9, a, c , t , x , a, c g 0, T = Q = A = C. 2.2 .  .  .
 .  . ` `ii Sublinear Growth in c There exist continuous maps l and f ,
called the recession functions of l and f , respecti¨ ely, such that
lim ry1 l t , x , a, rc s l` t , x , a, c .  .
rªq`
lim ry1 f t , x , a, rc s f ` t , x , a, c , .  .
rªq`
w x nuniformly on compact sets of 0, T = R = A = C.
 .  .  .  .Under Hypotheses H , for every admissible pair a, c g A t = C t, k
w x w xthe trajectory x a, c and the payoff P a, c are well defined. Moreover it
 w x.is straightforward to check see 14 that if x g Q, with Q a compact
subset, then there exists a compact Q9 > Q such that all trajectories
w xstarting at t from x remain inside Q9 during the whole time-interval t, T .
 .  .Let us remark that hypothesis i in H can be replaced by any other
condition guaranteeing existence, uniqueness, and a priori boundedness of
the trajectories.
As in the case with bounded controls, the game consists of the following:
w xÄat almost each instant t g t, T the a-Player, with knowledge of the
w xÄcontrol implemented by the c-Player in the past interval, t, t , chooses the
control a in order to minimize the payoff, while the c-Player chooses c
 w x.Äwith knowledge of a in t, t with the goal of maximizing the payoff. To
make the notion of the game precise, let us just adapt the definition of
 w x.strategy of Roxin, Varaya, Elliot, and Kalton see, e.g., 8 to the case
1  .where the L norm of c ? is uniformly bounded.
 .  .DEFINITION 2.1. A map a : C t, k ª A t is called a strategy for the
 . w xÄa-Player at t, k if it is nonanticipating, i.e., ; t g t, T and for any pair of
 .controls c , c g C t, k ,1 2
Äw xif c t s c t for a.e. t g t , t then .  .1 2
Äw xa c t s a c t for a.e. t g t , t . .  .  .  .1 2
 .Analogously, a strategy for the c-Player at t, k is a nonanticipating map
 .  .from A t into C t, k .
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 .The sets of strategies for the a-Player and the c-Player at t, k will be
 .  .denoted by D t, k and G t, k , respectively.
n . w w w xDEFINITION 2.2. For every t, x, k g 0, T =R = 0, K let us set
V t , x , k s inf sup P t , x , a c , c . . Ç
 .agD t , k  .cgC t , k
and
U t , x , k s sup inf P t , x , a, g a . . . Ç
 .agA t .ggG t , k
The maps V and U are called the lower ¨alue and the upper ¨alue of
the game, respectively.
We are now in the condition of stating the main result of the note. It
will be proved in the next section.
THEOREM 2.1. The functions U and V are continuous. Moreo¨er they
w x n w xcan be continuously extended to the closed domain 0, T = R = 0, K .
Finally, if the map g is bounded and there exist m , m ) 0 such that1 2
< < < nw xl t , x , a, c F m q m c ; t , x , a, c g 0, T = R = A = C , .  .1 2
then U and V are bounded as well.
3. PROOF OF THEOREM 2.1
The proof of Theorem 2.1 is a consequence of Proposition 3.1 below. In
what follows, by modulus we mean each nonnegative continuous map
 .h : R ª R such that h 0 s 0.
PROPOSITION 3.1. Let us fix a compact subset Q ; R n. Then there exists a
w wmodulus h such that, if t , t g 0, T , t F t , one has1 2 1 2
< <U t , x , k y U t , x , k F h t y t , a . . .  .2 1 2 1
< <V t , x , k y V t , x , k F h t y t , b . . .  .2 1 2 1
 . w xfor e¨ery x, k g Q = 0, K .
w wMoreo¨er, for e¨ery t g 0, T there exists a modulus h such thatt
< < < <U t , x ,k y U t , x ,k F h t y t , c .  .  . . t
< < < <V t , x ,k y V t , x ,k F h t y t , d .  .  . . t
w w  . w xfor e¨ery t g 0, T and x,k g Q = 0, K .
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Finally there are a constant M ) 0 and moduli v and m such that
< < < <U t , x , k y U t , x , k F v M ? x y x q m k y k e . . .  .  .2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1
< < < <V t , x , k y V t , x , k F v M ? x y x q m k y k f . . .  .  .2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1
w w  .  . w xfor e¨ery t g 0, T and x , k , x , k g Q = 0, K .1 1 2 2
Proof of Theorem 2.1. The last part of the thesis is trivial. Indeed one
has that
T w xl t , x a, c t , a t , c t dt F m T q m K , .  .  . .H 1 2
t
 . w x w x  .  .  .for every t, k g 0, T = 0, K and a, c g A t = C t, k . Hence, since
g is bounded, the lower and upper values are bounded as well.
In view of Proposition 3.1 the continuity of U and V is straightforward.
In order to prove that U and V can be extended to the closed domain
n nw x w x  . w x w x0, T = R = 0, K let us fix T , x, k g 0, T = R = 0, K and let us
set
h* s lim sup U t , x , k , h# s lim inf U t , x , k . .  .Ç Ç
 .  .t , x , k ª T , x , k .  .t , x , k ª T , x , k
 .  .Let us observe that in view of e , f of Proposition 3.1 it is not restrictive
to posit
h* s lim U t , x , k , h# s lim U t , x , k /  /2 1n nnª` nª`
 4  4for suitable sequences t and t converging to T.1 2n n
 4By possibly passing to a subsequence of t , we can also assume that2 n
 .t ) t , for every n g N. Hence, by a in Proposition 3.1 one has2 1n n
h* y h# s lim U t , x ,k y U t , x , k s 0. /  /2 1n nnª`
 .Moreover, b in Proposition 3.1 implies that the same result holds for V
as well. Therefore we can set
U T , x , k s lim U t , x , k , .  .Ç
 .  .t , x , k ª T , x , k
V T , x , k s lim V t , x , k . .  .Ç
 .  .t , x , k ª T , x , k
 .  .Thanks to e and f in Proposition 3.1, the obtained extensions of U and
V are continuous.
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Proof of Proposition 3.1. As we observed in the previous section, if the
initial value x lies in Q all trajectories starting from x remain inside a
 .compact subset Q9. In order to prove a , for any e ) 0 let us select
 .g g G t , k such that2 2
U t , x , k F inf P a, g a q e , . .2 2
 .ag A t2
 .  .and let us define g g G t , k by setting, for every a g A t ,1 1 1
w x0, ; t g t , t1 2
g a t s .  . Ç1  w xg a t , t g t , T , .  .Ä2 2
w xwhere a is the restriction of a to the subinterval t , T . Observe that gÄ 2 1
 .actually belongs to G t , k , in that1
T T
< < < <g a s ds s g a s ds F K y k . .  .  .  .ÄH H1 2
t t1 2
 .Let a g A t satisfy1
U t , x , k G P a, g a y e . .1 1
and let us set
t
x t s x t , x ; a, g a t , z t s l s, x s , a s , g a s ds .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .Ç Ç H1 1 1 1 1 1
t1
w xfor every t g t , T , and1
t
x t s x t , x ; a, g a t , z t s l s, x s , a s , g a s ds .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .Ç Ä Ä Ç Ä ÄH2 2 2 2 2 2
t2
w x w xfor every t g t , T . On the interval t , t one has2 1 2
t
< < < < < <x , z t y x , z t F f , l s, x s , a x , 0 ds F M ? t y t , .  .  .  .  .  .  . .H2 2 1 1 1 2 1
t1
 < . . <  . w x 4where M s max f , l t, x, a, 0 , t, x, a g 0, T = Q9 = A . Hence, forÇ
w xevery t g t , T , one obtains2
< <x , z t y x , z t .  .  .  .2 2 1 1
t
< < <F M ? t y t q f , l s, x s , a s , g a s .  .  .  .  . .Ä ÄH2 1 2 2
t2
<y f , l s, x s , a s , g a s ds .  .  .  .  . .Ä Ä1 2
t
< < < < < <F M ? t y t q L 1 q g a s x s y x s ds, .  .  .  . .ÄH2 1 2 2 1
t2
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which, by Gronwall's lemma, yields
< < < <x , z t y x , z t F M exp T L q K ? t y t . .  .  .  .  . .2 2 1 1 2 1
Therefore, in view of the uniform continuity of g on Q9 one has
U t , x , k y U t , x , k F P t , x ; a, g a y P t , x ; a, g a q 2e .  .Ä Ä Ä .  .2 1 2 2 1 1
s z T y z T q g x T y g x T q 2e .  .  .  . .  .2 1 2 1
< <F h t y t q 2e , .2 1
 .for a suitable modulus h. Since e is arbitrary, this yields a . The proof of
 .  .b is quite similar. Indeed, select a g D t , k such that1 1
V t , x , k G sup P a , c , c y e , . .1 1
 .cgC t , k1
 .and define a by setting, for every c g C t , k ,2 2
w xa c t s a c t , ; t g t , T , .  .  .  .Ç Ä2 1 2
 .where c g C t , k is defined byÄ 1
w x0 ; t g t , t1 2c t s . .Ä Ç  w xc t ; t g t , T . 1
 .  .Notice that a belongs to D t , k . After choosing a control c g C t , k so2 2 2
that
V t , x , k F P a c , c q e , . .2 2
 .  .and proceeding as in the proof of a , we obtain b .
In order to prove that
< <U t , x , k y U t , x , k F h t y t , c1 .  .  . . t
 .let us choose a strategy g g G t, k so thatt
U t , k F inf P a, g a q e . .  .t
 .agA t
 .In view of a it is not restrictive to assume t G t. Choose any a g A and,0
 .  .  . w xfor every a g A t , define a g A t by setting a s s a if s g t, t andÄ Ä Ç 0
 .  . x x  .a s s a s if s g t, T . Moreover, consider the strategy g g G t, k de-Ä Ç t
 . .  . .  . w xfined by g a s s g a s , for every a g A t and every s g t, T . SelectÇ Ät t
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 .a control a g A t so that
U t , x , k G P a, g a y e . .  .t
Let us set
s
x s s x t , x ; a, g a s , z s l j , x j , a j , g a j dj .  .  .  .  .  .  . .Ç Ä Ä Ç Ä ÄHt t t t t
t
w xfor every s g t, T , and
s
x s s x t , x ; a, g a s , z s l j , x j , a j , g a j dj .  .  .  .  .  .  . .Ç Ç Ht t t t t
t
w xfor every s g t, T .
 . .Thanks to the sublinearity of j ¬ f , l t, x, a, j , by applying Gronwall's
Lemma one has
t
< < < <x , l s y x , 0 F M s y t q N g a s ds, .  .  .  .  . . ÄHt t t
t1
w x  .for every s g t, t , where M and N are suitable positive constants.
 .Observe that, though the choice of a ? depends on t, the integrand in the
last term is independent of t. Indeed the restriction of a to the intervalÄ
w xt, t coincides with the fixed vector a . Therefore, since g is nonanticipat-0 t
 .  .ing, if t - t9 - t and if a9 g A t9, k is the corresponding choice of the
 . .  . . w xe-minimizer for g , one has g a9 t s g a t for every t g t, t9 . InÄ Ät9 t t
particular the integral in the previous inequality is infinitesimal when t
tends to t, i.e.,
< <x , l s y x ,0 F v t y t , .  .  . .t t t
where v is a modulus.t
w xMoreover, for each s g t, T one has
< <x , z s y x , z s .  .  .  .t t t t
s
< < < <F v t y t q L 1 q g a j x j y x j dj , .  .  .  .  .Ä .Ht t t t
t
which, by Gronwall's lemma, implies
< <x , z s y x , z s F Dv t y t , .  .  .  .  .t t t t t
w x w  .xfor every s g t, T and D s exp L T q K . Hence, since g is uniformlyÇ
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continuously on Q9, one obtains
U t , x , k y U t , x , k F P a, g a y P a,g a q 2e .  .  . . Ä Ät t
s z T y z T q g x T y g x T q 2e .  .  .  . .  .t t t t
< <F h t y t q 2e , .t
 .for a suitable modulus h . By the arbitrariness of e this yields c1 .t
For the purpose of proving
< <U t , x , k y U t , x , k F h t y t c2 .  .  . . t
 .  .}which, together with c , gives c }it is not restrictive to assume t - t,1
 .  .  .otherwise c2 is a consequence of a . Consider a strategy g g G t, kt
satisfying
U t , k , x F inf P a, g a q e , . . t
 .agA t
 .  .and, for every a g A t , define a g A t by setting a s a( j, whereÄ Ä Ç
T y t
j t s t q r ? t y t , r s - 1 .  .  .Ç Ç
T y t
w x  .  .for every t g t, T . It is easy to verify that the mapping g : A t ª C t, kt
defined by
y1 w xg a j s g a ( j j ;j g t , T , a g A t , .  .  .  .  .Ç Ät t
 .is actually a strategy belonging to G t, k . Indeed g is nonanticipating and,t
 .for every a g A t , it satisfies
T T
< < < <g a j dj s r g a t dt F r K y k F K y k . .  .  .  .  .ÄH Ht t
t t
 .Now select a g A t so that
U t , x G P a, g a y e , .  .t
and set
x j s x t , x ; a, g a j , .  .  .Çt t
j
z j s l s, x s , a s , g a s ds, .  .  .  .  . .Ç Ht t t
t
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w xfor every j g t, T , and
x t s x t , x ; a, g a t , .  .  .Ç Ä Ät t
t
z t s l s , x s , a s , g a s ds , .  .  .  .  . .Ç Ä ÄHt t t
t
w x  .for every t g t, T . Hence the map x , z ( j satisfiest t
< <x , z ( j t y x , z t .  .  .  ..t t t t
T
<F r ? f , l j s , x ( j s , a s , g a s .  .  .  .  .  . .Ä ÄH t t
t
<y f , l s , x s , a s , g a s ds .  .  .  .  . .Ä Ät t
T
< < < <F r y 1 ? f , l j s , x ( j s , a s , g a ds .  .  .  .  . .Ä ÄH t t
t
T
<q f , l j s , x ( j s , a s , g a s .  .  .  .  .  . .Ä ÄH t t
t
<y f , l s , x s , a s , g a s ds .  .  .  .  . .Ä Ät t
< <t y t T
< <F M ? q L 1 q g a s .  . .ÄH tT y t t
< < < <? x ( j s y x s q j s y s ds .  .  . . .t t
< <t y t
F M q L T q K ? . .
T y t
T
< < < <q L 1 q g a s x ( j s y x s ds , .  .  .  . .Ä H t t t
t
where M s M T q M K, M and M being constants}existing in view of1 2 1 2
 .  .ii of the Hypotheses H }such that
< < < <f , l t , x , a, c F M q M c .  . 1 2
 . w xfor every t, x, a, c g 0, T = Q9 = V = C. Hence, by Gronwall's Lemma,
we have
< <t y t
Ã< <x , z j t y x , z t F M ? expL T q K ? , .  .  .  .  . .t t t t T y t
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Ã  .where M s M q L T q K . Finally, the uniform continuity of the restric-
tion of g to Q9 yields
U t , x , k y U t , x , k F P a, g a y P a, g a q 2e .  .  . . Ä Ät t
s z T y z T q g x T y g x T q 2e .  .  .  . .  .t t t t
< <t y tÃF M ? expL T q K ? .
T y t
< <t y tÃq m M ? expL T q K ? q 2e , . /T y t
 .where m is a suitable modulus. Hence c2 is proved, with
s s
Ã Ãh s s MexpL T q K ? q m MexpL T q K ? . .  .  .Çt  /T y t T y t
 .  .The proof of d is similar to the proof of c . Let us just sketch the
construction of the needed strategies and controls. To prove that
< <V t , x , k y V t , x , k F h t y t , d1 .  .  . . t
 .observe first that, thanks to b , it is sufficient to consider the case when
 .t - t. Select a strategy a g D t, k satisfyingt
V t , x , k G sup P a c , c y e .  .t
 .cgC t , k
 .and define the strategy a g t, k by settingt
w xa c s s a c s , s g t , T .  .  .  .Ç Ät t
 .for every c g C t, k , where c is nothing but the restriction of c to theÄ
w x  .interval t, T . Furthermore choose a control c g C t, k so that
V t , x , k F P a c , c q e , . . t
 .and the proceed like in the proof of c1 .
To prove that
< <V t , x , k y V t , x , k F h t y t d2 .  .  . . t
 .}where, thanks to b , we limit ourselves to the case when t - t}let us
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 .select a strategy a g D t, k satisfyingt
V t , x , k G sup P a c , c y e . . . t
 .cgC t , k
 .  .Then define a strategy a g D t, k by setting, for every c g C t, k ,t
w xa c t s a c ( j t , s g t , T , .  .  .  .Ç Ät t
y1 .   ..where j is defined as in the proof of d , and c s c( j g C t, k . AfterÄ Ç
 .choosing a control c g C t, k such that
V t , x , k F P a c , c q e , .  .t
 .one can conclude the proof of d2 with arguments analogous to the ones
 .exploited in the proof of c2 .
 .  .Let us prove e . Consider a strategy g g G t, k such that2 2
U t , x , k F inf P a, g a q e . .2 2 2
 .agA t
 .  .and define a strategy g g G t, k by setting, for every a g A t ,1 1
Ãw xg a t ; t g t , t .  .2
g a t s , .  .1  Ãw x0, ; t g t , T
t w x < <  . . < 4Ãwhere t s sup t g t, T H g a s ds F K y k . It is straightforward toÇ t 2 1
check that
T
< <  4g a t dt F max 0, k y k , 3.1 .  .  .H 2 1 2
Ãt
 .for every a g A t .
 .Select a control a g A t so that
U t , x , k G P a, g a y e . .1 1 1
and set
t
x t s x t , x ; a, g a , z t s l s, x s , a s , g a s ds, .  .  .  .  .  .  . .Ç Ç Hi i i i i i
t
w xwhere i s 1, 2 and t g t, T . By Gronwall's Lemma one obtains
< < < <x , l t y x , l t F exp L T y K ? x y x , .  .  .  .  . .2 2 1 1 2 1
SLOW GROWTH DIFFERENTIAL GAMES 29
w x w xÃ Ãfor every t g t, t . If t g t, T one has
< <x , z t y x , z t .  .  .  .2 2 1 1
< <Ã ÃF x , z t y x , z t .  .  .  .2 2 1 1
t
<q f , l s, x s , a s , g a s .  .  .  .  . .H 2 2
Ãt
<y f , l s, x s , a s , g a s ds .  .  .  .  . .1 2
t
<q f , l s, x s , a s , g a s .  .  .  .  . .H 1 2
Ãt
<y f , l s, x s , a s , 0 ds .  .  . .1
t
< < < < < < <F exp L T q K ? x y x q L 1 q g a x s y x s ds .  .  .  .  .H2 1 2 2 1
Ãt
t
<q f , l s, x s , a s , g ¨ s .  .  .  .  . .H 1 2
Ãt
<y f , l s, x s , a s , 0 ds. .  .  . .1
 .Now 3.1 implies
T
< < < < <g a t dt y x g a t dt F k y k , .  .  .  .H Ã2 w t , t x 2 2 1
Ãt
which, in view of Lemma 3.1 below, yields
t
< <f , l s, x s , a s , g a s y f , l s, x s , a s ,0 ds .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . .  .H 1 2 1
Ãt
t
<s f , l s, x s , a s , g a s .  .  .  .  . .H 1 2
t
y f , l s, x s , a s , .  .  . 1
< < <x g a s ds F m k y k , .  .  ..Ãw t , t x 2 2 1
where m is a suitable modulus. By Gronwall's Lemma one can conclude
that
< 2 < < < <x , z t y x , z t F M x y x q Mm k y k , .  .  .  .  .2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1
  ..where M s exp L T q K . Hence, since the restriction of g to Q9 is
uniformly continuous, one has
U t , x , k q U t , x , k .  .2 2 1 1
F z T y z T q g x T q g x T q 2e .  .  .  . .  .2 1 2 1
< < <F v M x y x q m k y k q 2e , . .2 1 2 1
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where v is a suitable modulus. This inequality together with the one which
 .  .can be obtained by interchanging the roles of x , k and x , k yields1 1 2 2
 .e .
 .We just outline the proof of f , the remaining details being very similar
 .  .to those of the proof of e . Let us choose a strategy a g C t, k so that1 1
V t , x , k G sup P a c , c y e , . .1 1 1
 .cgC t , k1
 .and for every c g C t, k let us set2
Ãw xc t ; t g t , t .
c t s , .Ä  Ãw x0 ; t g t , T
where
t
< <Ã w xt s sup t g t , T : c s ds F K y k . .Ç H 1 5
t
 .Clearly c belongs to C t, k and satisfiesÄ 1
T
< <  4c s ds F max 0, k y k . .H 1 2
Ãt
 .  .  .  .Now define a g C t, k by setting a c s a c for every c g C t, k ,Ç Ä2 2 2 1 2
 .and select a control c g C t, k so that2
V t , x , k F P a c , c q e . . .2 2 2
After setting
t
x t s x t , x ; a c , c , z t s l s, x s , a c s , c, s ds .  .  .  .  .  .  . .Ç Ä Ä Ç Ä ÄH1 1 1 1 1 1
t
t
x t s x t , x ; a c , c , z t s l s, x s , a c s , c, s ds .  .  .  .  .  .  . .Ç Ç H2 2 2 2 2 2
t
w x  .  .for every t g t, T and proceeding as in the proof of e we obtain f .
LEMMA 3.1. Let Q9 ; R n be a compact subset, and define the continuous
map f : C ª R by setting
< <f c s max f , l t , x , a, c y f , l t , x , a, 0 , .  .  .  .  .Ç
w xt , x , a g t , T = Q9 = A . . 4
1 .  . .  w x x .Then the superposition operator c ? ª f c ? acts from L t, T , C into
1 w x x .L t, T , R and is continuous with respect to the norms of these spaces.
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 .Proof. From the assumption on f , l one obtains that there exist
constant M , M such that1 2
< < < <f c F M q M c , . 1 2
for every c g C. Therefore the thesis is a well-known result on superposi-
 w x.tion operators see, e.g., 21 .
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